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THE FINANCING OF LONG TERM CARE 
Two arguments, one for full Fed.eral fundi1lg and one for a continuance of 
state - Federal funding of long term care, are made in this chapter. Both 
arguments have one important area of agreement; they both set forth cost 
containment as a primary objective of any funding scheme. Furthermore, both 
C 
suggest that this can best be achieved through some form of prospective re-
imbursement. Under the present system of retrospective reimbursement Medicaid 
pays, without limit, for all eligible services provided. This) many believe, 
encourages the provision of unnecessary services which results in an unnatural 
escalation of costs. Prospective reimbursement sir.1ply means forecasting 
service needs for some future period (usually one year) and then determining 
how much will be paid for those services. This would establish a limit or 
• "cap" on Medicaid expendi tures which would presumably have the effect of con-
taining run-away costs. 
The fundamental difference between the two approaches is related to 
whether the funding and responsibility for long term care is best handled in 
a state-Federal partnership or solely at the Federal level. In this regard 
the burden of proof i's on the full federally funded argument simply because it 
suggests a significant departure from the present arrangement. The argument 
for continuance of the state-F~deral partnership is not, however, made without 
considerable difficulty due to the many existing criticisms of the status quo . 
• 
• 
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THE CASE FOR FULL FEDER~L FUNDING OF LONG TERM CARE 
The case for full Federal funding of long term care is based on three 
interdependent conditions. First, it has become increasingly obvious that 
health care, of which long term care is a part, has become a national re-
e 
sponsibility and should therefore be financed at the Federal level. Second, 
state and local government can no longer afford the rapidly increasing fiscal 
burden that results from financing long term care. Finally, the federal in-
come tax is the most appropriate revenue source from which to fund long term 
care by virtue of the fact that it is our most progressive tax. 
Federal Precedent 
In this century the Federal government's role in public health has 
~ gradually evolved towards greater responsibility and increased involvement. 
• 
In the early part of the twentieth century, for instance, the Federal govern-
ment enacted the Chaberlain-Kahn Act of 1918 (to combat Venereal Disease) 
and the Sherphard-Towner Act of 1928 (for maternal and child health). These 
made public health grants available for the first time. l The next step, the 
Social Security Act of 1935, given impetus by the depression, placed Federal-
State financing of public health on an enlarged and regular basis. Next in 
the chronology was the Federal government's participation in capital expenditures 
in the health field, or, as it was known legislatively, the Hill-Burton Act of 
1946. In the first twenty-five years of its existence, the Hill-Burton Act 
provided for the construction or modernization of 457,000 hospital and LTC 
beds, and 1,500 outpatient and rehabilitation facilities at the cost of $12 
billion. In 1960, the Kerr-~1ills Act was passed which specifically provided 
for Medical Assistance to the Aged. (MA~). 
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The Federal government's policy of gradualism up to the mid-1960!s seemed 
~ to advocate a commitment towards a Federal-State partnership in public health 
financing. However, in 1965 Congress added two new titles to the Social Security 
Act, (title XVII and title XIX), which illustrated Federal acceptance of a 
~ 
policy of substantially increased responsibility and involvement in public 
health, especially LTC. Title XVII, or Medicare, established a compulsory 
Federal insurance program for persons age 65 yeafs and older. Title XIX, or 
Medicaid, established a single program to substitute for the four categorical 
programs previously under MAA. In 1966 with the enactment of the Partnership 
for Health Act, the Federal government continued with the policy of increased 
involvement by engaging in sorely needed health planning. These measures, 
along with the Social Security Amendments of 1972 and the National Health Plan-
ning and Safety Act of 1974, exemplify the Federal government's role in the 
health care arena. 
It is evident that the Federal government realized respons~bility and 
took action in varied areas. It attempted to remedy special health problems 
of the nation, aid state and local governments that couldn't afford the cost 
of health assistance to their residents, subsidize capital expenditures in the 
health field, regulate the health field, engage in short and long term planning, 
and, most relevant to this analysis, provide long term care for the aged. It 
is the contention of this analysis that full Federal financing of LTC would 
be a natural and logical progression in Federal public health policy. 
State and Local Precedent 
The argument for full Federal financing of LTC can also be advanced from 
the perspective of state and local governments. The financial burden on 
• state a.nd especially local governments from public assistance expenditures 
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has become increasingly unbearable. Likewise, taxpayer discontent has resulted 
• from rising state and local taxes levied to meet public assistance expenditures 
(see Revenues section for complete discussion on taxation). The Advisory Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), a Washington based study group 
engaged in major policy studies, illustrates this point by noting that state 
G 
and local expenditures for public assistance doubled several times from 19S0 
to 1974. 3 In 1980 it is estimated that state and local Medicaid outlays for 
LTC will be $4.6 billion4 excluding administrative costs which in 1977 were 
estimated to be about $788 million. S With these spiraling costs in mind, a-
nother ACIR study recommended "that the Federal government assume full financ.ial 
responsibility for the provision of public assistance, including general assist-
ance and Medicaid. 1I6 
Full Federal takeover of LTC is aimed at resolving disparities in the 
~ Medicaid program's handling of LTC, resulting from differences in resource 
capacity from state to state. The resource capacity of a state, simply the 
~ 
amount of money a state wishes to spend through Medicaid on LTC, can vary 
according to the State's eligibility requirements, LTC services covered by the 
State, and the State's reimbursement policies, all of which are discretionary 
beyond Federal guidel'ines. 7 The Federal takeover proposal is also designed 
to relieve the inequities of fragmentation and the inefficiency of multiplicity 
within Medicaid program categories relative to LTC. The potential for stream-
lining the present conflicting and overlapping regulatory deluge would be in-
herent in the Federal approach to financing LTC. The Federal takeover proposal 
suggests a single regulatory body to monitor LTC facilities and services as 
opposed to the present Federal, state, and local regulatory agencies monitoring 
LTC. 
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Having established precedent in the field, this analysis shall now suggest 
• direction for the next step in the Federal government's policy of gradualism 
• 
relative to LTC for the aged. The suggestions brought forth in this analysis 
will only address the financial aspects and implications of long term care. 
The Federal government will be considered ihe subsidizer, the referral mechanism, 
and the provider of LTC in the setting of complete Federal takeover of LTC. 
Reimbursement 
In fiscal year 1976, government programs paid an estimated $10.5 billion 
for LTC services; of this $5 billion was paid for by the Federal government and 
$5.5 billion by state and local governments. Over half of all LTC expenditures 
($5.7 billion) were paid through the Federal/State Medicaid programs. 8 In 
1979 it is estimated that $8.3 to $8.4 billion in Medicaid money will be spent 
on LTC services, and by 1985 an estimated $20.5 to $21.6 billion in Medicaid 
money will be spent on LTC services. 9 To conlcude that there' i~ an uncontrolled 
upward spiral would not be an overstatement. Under existing guidelines and 
retrospective reimbursement practices Medicaid expenditures for LTC will increase 
by about 300% from 1976 to 1985. 
Medicaid's open":ended categorical grants to state and local governments 
have been accused of spiraling costs upward through retrospective reimbursement 
practices. Under retrospective reimbursement a facility first delivers care to 
a patient who is presumed Medicaid eligible, and then bills Medicaid afterwards. 
As early as 1966, H.R. Sommers warned about Medicaid's uncontolled costs due 
t .. b . 10 o retrospectlve relm ursement practlves. The Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration (HCFA) of the Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) is 
also skeptical of present reimbursement practices, as is illustrated by their 
• funding of prospective reimbursement demonstrations under section 222 of the 
HCFA. In 1977, Robert Derzon, the administrator of the HCFA, said, "We (HCFA) 
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would like to initiate reforms in reimbursement and redirect incentives away 
• from high cost technological care. ,,11 
• 
In the full Federal takeover proposal for financing LTC a prospective re-
imbursement system would replace the retrospective system that currently exists. 
The reason for the departure from the current system is that it provides little 
incentive for LTC facilities to operate efficiently or with any sense of "cost 
conscientiousness". In prospectite reimbursement systems the level of the re-
ceipts is fixed which will encourage LTC facilities to operate in an economically 
12 
efficient manner. Thus, prospective reimbursement has the potential to 
reward efficient LTC facilities and penalize inefficient LTC facilities. 
As of 1976, there were some twenty-six prospective reimbursement programs 
13 
operating throughout the country and because they differed, there is a need 
for clairification as to what is meant by prospective reimbursement for the 
purposes of this analysis. In this analysis prospective reimbursement refers 
to predetermined regional budgets for the delivery of a well-defined array of 
LTC services for a fixed period of time. Current Health System Agency (HSA) 
regions would constitute the regional levels at which LTC budgets would be set. 
(Health Systems Agencies [HSA] are planning and development bodies created 
by the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 [Public 
Law 93-641]). The United States has been divided into 213 "health services 
areas", each of which is served by an HSA. Budget allocations would be based 
upon planning activities of the region's HSA and would take into consideration 
such factors as the region's LTC resources, the region's current LTC needs, 
and the region's projected LTC needs. A region's budget would provide for the 
total LTC needs of the entire service area on a capitation basis. A region's 
budget allocation would reflect the region's financial responsibility to provide 
• for only those services that meet the region's LTC demands as determined by 
the respec.tive HSA. Facilities or services that are not needed in a region 
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would not be considered in the figuring of the region's budget allocation. Once 
• a fixed dollar amount is arrived at and is received by the HSA, (a process 
which will be discussed below), yearly operating budgets will be apportioned to 
the LTC providers in the region. The LTC providers would be paid prospectively 
by the HSA at 1/52 of the providers approved annual budget each week. 
With information supplied by the HSA's throughout the United States, a 
c . 
mandatory standard rate (MSR) of reimbursement would be set for each level of 
LTC offered. Rate adjustments could be made for capital expenditures, but only 
if the capital expenditure was approved previously by the certificate of needs 
program of the respective HSA. Another important aspect of this proposed re-
imbursement system would be that the MSR's would be tied to the Consumer Price 
Index so that LTC costs would not be allowed to rise faster than other prices 
in the economy . 
• Implementation 
It would be necessary to amend certain administration procedures to implement 
this prospective reimbursement system for a full Federal takeover of LTC. First, 
LTC reimbursement would have to be severed from titles XVIII and XIX of the 
Social Security Act and lJe provided for as a complete entity in itself in an 
effort to improve the monitoring and evaluating of both the LTC program and the 
remaining Medicaid and Medicare programs. Medicaid and Medicare data would no 
longer be skewed by the inclusion of massive LTC expenditures. Likewise, LTC 
data would emerge in a "cleaner" form, free from the statistics of the remaining 
health field, arming policy makers with better information as a basis for 
their decisions relative to LTC. In the present system, this type of LTC in-
formation flow is impeded by fragmented jurisdictions and conflicting eligibility 
• requirements and level of care categories. 
• 
• 
• 
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Another administrative change, the establishment of uniform eligibility re-
quirements and levels of care categories, would be the next step in implementing 
the full Federal financing of LTC proposal. Although it is commonly held that 
increased eligibility results in higher costs, there is evidence to show that 
these higher costs due to increased eligibility are only temporary and will 
slack off in time. In a study by Barbara Boland on the AFDC program it was 
noted that even under a continuation o~the present Medicaid program, increases 
in the number of eligibles would be a much less important factor because current 
1 d b · 1" 14 case oa s are sta 1 lZlng. Granting further support to this concept, John 
Holahan, in his book Financing Health Care for the Poor, suggests that "A 
program with broad population covereage would avoid the problem of continually 
rising costs because, while large increases in eligibility and utilization would 
occur following the initial expansion of coverage, they would not occur over 
t
. ,,15 lme. While acknowledging that increased eligibility could increase inflationary 
pressure, Mr. Holahan estimates that prospective reimbursement would do much to 
mitigate these inflationary price effects. 
The next step towards full Federal financing of LTC would be to designate 
current HSA regions as LTC reimbursement areas. As mentioned above the HSA would 
be the rate-setting body that would determine the regional capitation budgets 
for LTC services. The purpose behind using the HSA as the rate-setting body is 
an effort to tie the planning function (already inherent in HSAs) to the rate-
setting function. In 1977 the Institutional Reimbursement Conference Report 
held that the coordination of the rate-setting function and the planning function 
h d 'b . d . .. b 16 soul e an essential conSl eratlon to any prospectlve relm ursement system. 
To do this successfully would mean that the LTC services that are rendered 
are those that have been deemed necessary by extensive HSA studies on utilization 
review, needs assessment, accessibility, and resource availability. For too 
long, LTC utilization rose to the availab1e supply of LTC services, a concept 
• 
• 
• 
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which has received some support in recent economic studies. 17 
The use of HSAs is meant to foster the concept of regionalization. The 
aim of this regionalized system is to make substantial gains in access, ef-
ficiency, and equity through emphasis on the planning function of the HSA. 
Increasing access, a desired result of regionalization, might initially raise 
costs, but, once stabilized, costs would level off over time and the system 
C 
would prove more cost efficient in the long run. Eli Ginzberg, Director of 
the Conservation of Human Resources Department at Columbia University, supports 
the concept of Federal regionalization. He states: 
Many State and Local governments simply cannot cope 
with the range of complex issues involved in the region-
alization of health resources and delivery systems. The 
widespread weakness of these non-Federal structures is a 
clue as to how fast and how far the Federal government can 
encourage regionalization. 18 
In summarizing the attributes of regionalization, a 1952 Presidential 
Commission's finding are informative. It defined the range of desirable goals 
of developing regionalization to be (1) increased patient knowledge and con-
venience, (2) greater access to health care services, (3) higher quality care, 
and (4) improved efficiency at less cost for health care services. 19 
Revenues 
Under the present Federal/State Medicaid program, matching funds constitute 
the revenue source. The Federal share of a state's Medicaid program is between 
50% and 80%, depending upon the per capita income of the state's population. 
The Federal government pays the remainder of the Medicaid bill after the state 
pays its share, within the 50% to 80% guidelines. 
State and local governments have become increasingly aware of the growing 
burden of LTC costs, for the state and local shares of the Medicaid program 
are derived from property taxes and sales taxes. In 1972, ACIR reported that 
from 1951 to 1971 there were 480 tax rate increases and 40 new taxes enacted into 
• 
• 
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law by state legislatures to meet the increasing burden of general and public 
20 
assistance costs. This entire concept, the use of state and local revenues 
to provide for costly income-redistributing purposes such as Medicaid, has 
been deemed "particularly questionable and economically inefficient" by ACIR. 21 
Tax efficiency and tax equity are two qualities against which taxes can 
be evaluated. Tax efficiency measures the way a given tax affects the allocation 
of resources, taxpayer compliance, and collection costs. Tax equity is concerned 
C 
with the tax treatment of economically unequal persons, and their ability to 
22 pay. Sales tax is usually ranked higher in the efficiency category because 
it is a broad based tax and has no effect on relative commodity prices; however, 
sales tax is viewed as a tax on consumption and has a regressive effect on 
the distribution of income. This phenomenon renders sales tax inequitable by 
putting a heavier tax burden on lower income people. Property tax ranks low in 
both efficiency and equity. This is due to the fact that property tax is 
disproportionally costly to administer and tends to distort the,pattern of land 
use. Plugging the progressive income tax into the framework of tax equity and 
tax efficiency yields positive results. The prog~essive income tax is clearly 
justified on the ability to pay principle and has little effect on the operation 
of the economy; ther~fore, it is ranked high in both tax equity and tax ef-
f '. 23 lClency. 
Another way taxes can be evaluated is by determining their elasticity co-
efficient. The elasticity coefficient of a given tax illustrates the responsive-
ness of the tax to economic growth relative to its base. Therefore, elasticity 
measures the way in which the tax behaves in comparison with changes in national 
income. An elasticity coefficient of less than 1 indicates that the change in 
tax yields was proportionately less than the change in national income. An 
• elasticity coefficient equal to 1 means that tax yields changed proportionately 
to the change in national income. The elasticity coefficient is greater than 
• 
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I when the tax yield changes were greater proportionally, than the change in 
. l' 24 nat lona J,ncome. 
In 1965 ACIR published a summary report of the estimated elasticity co-
25 
efficients of various taxes. The summary showed that the median elasticity 
coefficients for both property tax and sales tax were less than 1, reflecting 
that they are inelastic. Conversely, the median elasticity coefficient for the 
income tax (greater than 1), demonstrating that the tax yield changes were 
greater, proportionally, than the change in national income. 
The evidence of both tax efficiency/tax equity framework for evaluating 
tax systems and the elasticity coefficient support the premise that LTC revenue 
would be more equitably derived from ~ progressive income tax than from state 
and local property and sales taxes. 
Under full Federal financing of LTC, revenues would be derived from the 
• Federal government whose primary revenue source is a progressive tax, income 
tax. Although this might increase the amount of individual income tax paid 
across the country, a severe financial burden would be lifted from state and 
local governments. ACIR concludes that if the Federal government were to 
take over the entire cost of Medicaid, about two-thirds of the benefit would go 
26 to the states and and' one-third would go to local governments. Even though 
this proposal is not aimed at a Federal takeover of the entire Medicaid program, 
surely substantial savings could be realized by both state and local govern-
ments in a full Federal takeover of LTC. 
Opponents of the full Federal financing of LTC point out that state and 
local tax decreases are not necessarily synonymous with this proposal. Opponents 
contend that state and local taxes will not decrease even though state and local 
outlays for Medicaid will. However, the intended tax relief properties of 
~ this proposal are not designed to force tax relief, but only to make the 
potential for tax relief available at the -state and local levels. Potentially, 
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under the proposal for full Federal financing of LTC, state and local govern-
• ments could decrease sales tax and property tax and spur economic growth as well 
as ease taxpayer discontent. It is beyond the consideration of this analysis 
to propose any mechanism to interfere with the taxation powers of state and local 
governments. The impetus for tax relief will have to come from the constituencies 
of states and localities as did California's Proposition 13, a grassroots 
initiated voter referendum which mandated tax cuts. 
Profit Motive 
If the profit motive was ever a positive force in the development of the 
LTC industry, it is no longer. Many people today charge that the profit motive 
is inconsistent with good LTC and the values of American society. There also 
seems to be a strong belief in this country that those market mechanisms that 
~ some say are missing and are the cause of the high costs in the LTC sector 
should not be encouraged in the LTC sector because of the nature of the services 
• 
offered and powerlessness of the recipients. In his discussion of general 
assumptions in public choice analysis Robert Bish states that "Goods and 
services desired by individuals possess diverse characteristics, including 
characteristics which make them difficult or impossible to provide through 
k I 1 .. ,,27 mar et or pure y va untary actlvlty. 
Certainly LTC is one area in which normal market activity has been less 
than successful and has caused the eruption of myriad problems such as in-
stitutional scandals, patient abuse, and profiteering LTC operators. 
Allegations that the profit motive is injurious to good LTC do not go 
unsubstantiated. In 1971 the Connecticut Department of Finance and Control, 
Budget Division, released a study that s110wed that the LTC industry had a rate 
28 ' 
on investments double that of the top SOO U.S. corporations. In 1976 the 
Report of the New York State Moreland Commission on Nursing Homes and Residential 
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Facilities released findings that strongly associated poor LTC and high profit 
~ margins. 29 In March 1977 the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO issued a state-
ment recommending that Federal funds be limited to non-profit LTC facilities 
because of the windfall profits and poor care in for-profit facilities. 3D 
Political Feasibility 
Full Federal financing of long term care would have a strong political im-
pact and there are political factors which must be considered. First, there is 
the creation and elimination of jobs brought about by the implementation of the 
full Federal financing of LTC proposal; second, the issue of special interest 
group pressure and its impact on the Federal level vs. the state/local level; 
and last, the loss of control over the LTC field by state and local governments. 
The political feasibility of! this proposal is predicated, in part, upon 
~ its impact on the job market. It is almost certain that this proposal for 
financing LTC will eliminate certain state and local government positions that 
deal with the regulation, administration, and reimbursement of LTC. Conversely, 
there would be a need for manpower to staff the newly formed Federal program. 
To circumvent almost certain union and local political actions, the Federal 
government could give state and local government employees who were left job-
less because of the implementation of this proposal top priority in hiring for 
the Federal positions. Another approach to this problem would be to make 
available Federal subsidies to state and local governments to keep these 
employees on until they can be placed in the respective state or local govern-
ment office. 
Special interest group pressure is also an issue related to the political 
feasibility of the full Federal financing of LTC. State and local decision-
• making on issues relative to LTC is plagued with intervention from self-serving 
special interest groups. A 1976 New York State Moreland Act Commission on 
• 
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Nursing Homes and Residential Facilities substantiated this special interest 
group pressure in reporting that "Private nursing home interests were able to 
obtain and employ political influence to achieve their ends on an impressive 
31 
scale." The finds of the Moreland Commission typify the extent of special 
interest pressure that is exerted at the state and local level. Under the 
proposed LTC program, special interest pressure at the state and local level 
would be useless because policy decisions would be made at the Federal level 
where special interests from a state or locality yield considerably less 
leverage. 
The loss of state and local control, and issue which is often brought up 
in national health insurance discussions, would have minimal impact on this 
proposal. Full Federal financing of LTC would control only that part of the 
health field that provides LTC. The remaining Medicaid program would still be 
• subject to local control. Since relatively little control over health care 
would be relinquished by state or local governments, and substantial savings 
could be realized by state and local governments, this factor should not 
detract from the political feasibility of the proposal. 
Conclusion 
The future of LTC is far from resolved. As the elderly population in-
creases and resources remain finite or even decrease, difficult decisions will 
have to be made. Unless American society de-emphasizes institutionalized care, 
or positive changes in life-style prolong life and influence the quality of 
life, restrictive action in the health field will have to be taken. Either 
more of the gross national product will have to be spent on health care, (meaning 
less spent elsewhere), or health services and/or eligibility requirements will 
• have to be restricted. The harsh realities of any health policy were summed 
up best by British politician, J. Enoch Powell, who ran his country's National 
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Health Service in the early 1960's. Mr. Powell noted that "Whatever the 
~ expenditures on health care, demand is likely to rise to meet and exceed it. 
~ 
• 
To believe that one can satisfy the demand for health care if illusory.,,32 
This is not to imply that there is no chance of an efficient and responsive 
LTC plan. But LTC must be controlled if future demands are to be met rationally 
and equitably. The above-mentioned proposal for financing LT~ has the systemic 
ability to control and monitor the LTC field ona nation-wide basis, which is 
sorely needed at this point in time if future demands are to be adequately 
met by the system. 
THE CASE FOR CONTINUED STATE FUNDING OF LONG TERM CARE 
The case for continued state funding is based upon the concept of states 
bearing at least part of the fiscal burden for. services over which they main-
tain some control. If some state control over the quantity and,quality of 
long term care is desirable, then so is state funding because it enhances the 
likelihood that states act responsibly. In this section we will briefly 
examine the present relationship between the states and the Federal government 
and between the states and service providers (i.e., nursing homes). The 
problems associated with these relationships will be explored and then recom-
mendations designed to decrease the effect of these problems but still maintain 
the basic fiscal framework of Medicaid reimbursement for long term care will 
be proposed. 
According to Title XIX of the Social Security Act which became effective 
January 1, 1966, the Medicaid program was established; 
For the purpose of enabling each state, as far as practicable 
under the conditions in such state, to furnish (1) medical 
assistance on behalf of families with dependent children and 
of aged, blind, or disable individuals, whose income and re-
sources are insufficient to meet the cost of necessary medical 
• 
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services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to help 
such families and individuals attain or retain capability for 
independence or self-care (SEC 1901). 
The population eligible under the Medicaid program consists of two 
categories: persons whose eligibility is mandatory, and persons whose coverage 
is optional. Mandatory eligibility, generally referred to as the categorically 
needy, is comprised of all individuals who receive aid or assistance under 
Title I, X, XIV, or part of Title IV and those receiving supplmental security 
income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Persons whose coverage is 
optional, generally referred to as medically needy, are individuals who fit 
into one of the categories of people covered by cash welfare programs, in-
dividuals who have enough income to pay for their basic living expenses (and 
. . f f ) b ?::::h f h' d' 1 33 so are not recIplents 0 weI are ut not eno~ to payor t elr me lca care. 
Medicaid services are divided into two categories: mandatory services and 
• optional services. There are seven mandatory services: inpatient hospital 
care; outpatient hospital services; other laboratory x-ray services; skilled 
nursing facility services and home health services for individuals 21 and 
older; early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment for individuals 
under 21; family planning; and physicians services. The law provides for 17 
optional medical services including clinic services, prescribed drugs, dental 
~ervices, prosthetic devices, eyeglasses, private duty nursing, physical 
therapy, services of optometrists, podiatrists, and chiropractors, skilled 
nursing facility services for patients under 21, emergency hospital services, 
care for patients over 65 and institutions for mental disorders and for 
tuberculosis, care for patients under 21 in psychiatric hospitals, institutional 
services in intermediate care facilities and other diagnostic, screening, 
preventative and rehabilitative services . 
• States have the option to provide non-mandato~y services to both categori-
cally and medically needy persons. Illinois, New York, Minnesota, Washington, 
• 
• 
• 
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and Wisconsin are the only states which provide all 17 of the optional services 
under their Medicaid programs. 
State expenditures eligible for Federal reimbursement are determined by 
state plans submitted to HEW for approval. The amount of the Federal share is 
determined by a formula which provides a matching percentage equal to the 
difference between 100 percent and 45 percent of the ratio of the squared per 
capita income of a given state to the squared per capita income of the United 
States. No state, however, may have a Federal Medical Assistance percentage 
of less than 50 percent and more than 83 percent. In addition, seven relatively 
small expenditure categories pertaining to administration are subject to fixed 
percentage Federal Payments. Per capita personal income incorporated into 
various grant need formuals is an attempt to redistribute funds from higher 
c 
to lower recipient areas . 
Perceived Problems in the Federal Medicaid Structure 
Martha Derthick, the author of Uncontrollable Spending for Social Services 
Grants, points to significant problems related to the open-ended categorical 
grant model. Derthick states: 
Spending for social services grants soared from $354 
million in 1969 to 1.69 billion in 1972. The President's 
budget estimate of $937 million for social service grants 
in 1972 was too low by nearly $1 billion. Social services 
were "uncontrollable" primarily because they were open-
ended. This was changed in the form of legislation in 1974 
when Title XX was created and a ceiling of $2.5 billion on 
federal spending was set. 34 
The same dramatic increase in expenditures is currently evident in the 
Medicaid program. As was noted earlier, Medicaid expenditures are estimated 
to increase 66 percent from FY 1975 to FY 1978 . 
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The Current Reimbursement Structure for Long-Term Care: State Level 
• At the present, the individual states have the responsibility of managing 
the Medicaid program. States reimburse monies to providers, set standards of 
care, assure that facilities meet standards, audit, license, certify service 
providers, and tax their constituents to meet the Federal match. The primary 
area of emphasis in this section shall be the means by which states reimburse 
long-term care providers. The states of Ohio, Connecticut, and New York have 
been pursuing new alternatives in this area and for this reason, have been 
selected as the primary states to be critiqued. 
In Ohio, nursing homes are reimbursed on what the state terms as a 
prospective basis. A per diem rate to be paid in the future is calculated for 
each home based on past cost. Costs reported for the six months ending December 
31, 1975, were used to set rates for calendar year 1977. The nursing home's 
• 
\J 
rate is then multiplied by the number of patient days at the home each month 
to determine the monthly reimbursement. In cases of misrepresentation of cost 
and/or services rendered or concealment of data which would indicate a lower 
rate than a home is receiving, the rate is not adjusted rety,oactively. The 
average per diem rate for Ohio nursing homes was $19.32 in June 1977. 
In June 1977, 77 homes were participating in the Medicaid program and 
were paid about $1.1 million. Ohio requires that cost reports be filled out 
within 90 days after the end of the reporting period. Failure to file a timely 
cost report results in a nursing home being paid at their current standing 
rate. The rate is revised when the nursing home submits its cost report. If 
the report indicates the home was over-paid during the period for which it 
failed to file, Ohio reduces future payments until the overpayment is recouped. 
• 
If the home can justify an increased rate, the increase is delayed by the 
number of months the required reports are late. 
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Since 1974, Ohio has calculated the reimbursement rate by comparing nursing 
~ home reported costs to establish line-item-cost ceilings and overall cost ceilings. 
Ohio used the lower of the reported costs or line-item-cost ceilings. Ohio com-
pares the resulting costs per patient day to the overall cost ceiling and reduces 
h · '1' 'f 36 to t lS cel lng 1 necessary. 
In Connecticut, the Department of Social Services CDSS) administers the 
Medicaid program together with other state welfare programs. Long-term care 
accounted for 53 percent of Connecticut Medicaid expenditures in FY 1976. Initially, 
Connecticut used a point system for reimbursement whereby a home could qualify 
for a higher classification and a higher reimbursement level by providing ser-
vices beyond health code standards. This strategy resulted in general upgrading 
of institutions, but not necessarily care. A report developed by the Legislative 
Program Review and Investigations Committee entitled, Containing Medicaid Costs 
• in Connecticut, states: 
• 
There was no reational relationship between point~ for 
classification and costs. Homes had an incentive to provide 
"services"--sometimes unrelated to patient needs--and many of 
them did. 37 
In 1975, a temporary system was developed using interim rates to reimburse 
providers while the point ssystem was phased out and institution of a new cost-
related system could be implemented. These rates were based on 1974 costs, 
plus 5 percent for inflation. The new cost-related system was slated to go into 
effect January 1, 1978. 
The cost-related reimbursement system is based on a breakdown of costs and 
assets at each home as follows: 
A. Controlled cost centers 
1. Dietary 
2. Nursing 
3, Laundry 
4. Housekeeping 
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B. Uncontrolled costs 
• 
1. Management services (reviewed for reasonableness) 
2. Utilities 
3. Accounting fees 
4. Other 
C. Asset Valuation 
1. Building 
2. Land 
3. Appurtenances 
Under the controlled cost centers category, dietary, laundry, housekeeping, 
and nursing expenditures will be contained. Nursing homes, profit and non-
profit together, will be grouped by size and cl~ss, and rank ordered by cost 
in each of the controlled cost centers. Costs, up to the 80th percentile, for 
each size and class in each cost center will be fully reimbursed. The most ex-
pensive homes (top 20 percent) will be reimbursed at the rate of homes at the 
80th percentile. The maximum annual cost increase which is reimbursable in any 
• cost center, will be the previous years cost multiplied by the current gross 
national product (GNP) deflator. 
The uncontrolled cost category, unlike nursing or dietary services, cannot 
be grouped across homes. The cost would include: utilities, employee benefits, 
self-employment taxes, and maintenance costs. These costs will be examined for 
their lfreasonableness" and verified by field audit. 
The asset valuation category bases the asset valuation in its proposed re-
imbursement system on the "Fair Rental Value System." Under this sytem, all 
homes are depreciated on a straight line basis with an average life of 40 years. 
All long-term care facilities seeking Medicaid reimbursement will be required 
to submit to the Committee on state payments an annual report by December 31st 
of each year. Based on the detailed annual report, desk auditors will determine 
• 
an interim rate for each facility. After independent field auditors verify the 
information provided, the interim rate, with adjustments if indicated, will 
become the actual rate for that year. 
• 
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The Moreland Commission Report which reviewed the long-term care industry 
in New York State explains in detail the New York State rate setting system. The 
system developed by the state has been viewed by many observers as one of the 
several models that other states might follow in developing a "cost-related" 
approach to Medicaid reimbursement. In New York State, nursing home operators 
are required to submit to the state a detailed statement of operating costs for 
the preceeding year certified by public accountants. Following this the state-
ments are desk audited by the Division of Heal~r Economics. Total allowable 
costs are divided either by the actual number of patient or resident days of 
care rendered in the year for which costs have been reported or by that number 
of patient days which would have been rendered had the facility experienced an 
average occupany rate of 90 percent. Whichever number is greater is employed. 
Nursing homes are then grouped by the division in accordance with bed size, 
• location within the state, and sponsorship. There exist five bed size ranges, 
seven regional divisions, and three sponsorship classifications ,(proprietary, 
voluntary, and government). For each such group, weighted average per diern 
amounts of two kinds are calculated. The first is an average combined per diem 
cost of administrative, dietary, and housekeeping services. The second is the 
overall average per diem cost, excluding property costs, cost of therapy drugs, 
and return-an-equity. Per diem costs 15 percent above such group averages 
also would be disallowed. A "role factor" is applied to per diem costs. The 
"role factor" consists of the set of projections of inflation and the prices 
of various components of facility costs, i.e., wage rates, food prices, fuel, 
drugs, etc. When applied to base year per diem costs, the role factor fixes a 
"prospective" rate which would provide reimbursement to a facility sufficient 
to maintain its base year pattern of expenditures, despite changes in prices 
•. anticipated from the base year to the rate year. Should actual costs in the 
rate year be below those anticipated by the prospective rate, through the achiave-
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ment of efficiencies of one form or another, a facility would earn a profit 
• f 
. 38 
rom operatlons. 
• 
• 
Perceived Problems in the State Reimbursement of Long-Term Care 
A problem commonly perceived by states is providing nursing homes with 
incentives related to cost containment. In Connecticut, under their new re-
imbursement system, efficient management will be rtwarded by allowing a facil 
to keep 10 percent of the difference between its actual costs and ceilings set 
for each cost center} when the difference is $1,000 or more. In New York State, 
a fixed percentage of the difference between a home's actual costs and reimburse-
ment ceilings are used as an incentive. 
A second problem, one focused on by the Moreland Commission concerns Medi-
caid reimbursement of nursing home property costs. The report states: 
There has existed every temptation for owners to misrepresent 
costs of constructions or interest charges on morgage loans and 
to misstate a variety of other real property costs in order to 
obtain higher reimbursement .... Clear incentives have existed for 
establishing "fictitious" costs based upon transactions among un-
related parties. 
In response to the Moreland Commission Report, New York State has adopted 
the "Fair Rental System." The Fair Rental System does not permit reimbursement 
to vary, depending on whether a facility is leased or operated directly by an 
owner and does not change because of sales from one entrepreneur to another. 
This system mandates that all homes are depreciated based on an average life of 
40 years. It is anticipated that the system shall end the practice of rapid 
turnover, inflated prices and lease-back arrangements. Thus, we have a valid 
example of a state able to rectify its errors and incorporate into its system 
a cost containing instrument which is responsive to its O\\TJ1 needs. 
States have also become increasingly aw.are of the negative impact of in-
appropriate placement of indivudals in LTC and differing level of care within the 
• 
• 
• 
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industry. The Comptroller General's report on the Ohio Medicaid program con-
cludes that: 
Ohio is wasting millions of dollars annuaJly because the 
SNF benefit is not being effectively used as an alternative for 
high cost hospitalization. 39 
The report goes on to predict that the cost of care for 10,000 intermediate 
care patients incorrectly classified as SNF (skilled nursing facility) patients 
could create an overpayment of $73 million per year if skilled and intermediate 
care facility rates are $45 and $25 per day respectively. 
The problem of appropriate placement in retation to cost containment is 
discusssed in the report prepared by the Connecticut Legislative Review and 
Investigations Committee studying containing Medicaid costs. It states: 
While the number of Medicaid recipients has only doubled 
from about 90,000 in 1967 to about 180,000 in 1976, Medicaid 
expenditures were six times higher in 1976 (188 million) than 
in 1967 (32 million). A major cause of Medicaid cost increases 
in Connecticut is the imbalance in levels of care provided by the 
nursing home industry. Connecticut spends nearly half of its 
Medicaid budget on expensive skilled nursing care, while other 
states average only 20 percent. Conversely, other states average 
about 16 percent of Medicaid budgets for lower cost intermediate 
care, while Connecticut spends only 4 percent. 40 
The Moreland Commission Report in New York State also suggests that sig-
nificant inappropriate placement is impacting on cost containment activities 
since little, if any, variation in cost "can be explained by the assumption 
h . d f . . 1141 that higher cost omes are treating patients ln nee 0 more lntenslve care. 
The report goes on to state: 
Undermining many regulatory efforts is the near total lack of 
monitoring or control over decisions affecting the placement of 
individuals in homes. State regulatory agencies have failed to 
define explicit rules and to implement effective procedures to 
determine which patients or residents might require the most ex-
pensive "skilled nursing" level of care, which might require 
!Iheal th related" care, and which can be successfully cared for in 
domicilIary facilities. 42 
• 
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Recommended Structural Changes in the Current Long-Term Care Reimbursement System 
Thus far, this paper has explained existing structures related to long-term 
care reimbursement and illustrated perceived problems within the structures. The 
paper will now focus on recommendations applicable to long-term care funding. 
It is recommended that the Federal and state roles in the financing of long-
term care remain essentially as they are. That is, the Federal government 
should continue to provide matching moneys and states should continue to manage 
the long-term care industry. Further, states should continue to bear a fiscal 
tax burden for the provision of service to their constituents in their respective 
localities. 
Recommendation #1 
That the current "Medicaid" categorical grant-in-aid Federal program be 
altered to establish a separate Federal categorical grant-in-aid program ex-
• clusively for long-term care funding. It is further recommended that the cate-
gorical grant would have considerable impact on containing the r~pid expansion 
• 
of Medicaid costs. By splitting the current Medicaid categorical grant approxi-
mately in half, it may be possible to place ceilings on both the medical assis-
tance and long-term care Federal allocations. Further, such a step ,should 
promulgate a similar separation of long-term care administration on the state 
level. This would service to heighten the amount of attention paid to the unique 
problems related to long-term care services. Utilizing the close-ended approach 
would promote sounder fiscal planning on the Federal and state level. The ceiling 
or "CAP" would force states to develop prospective expnediture estimates in order 
to assure federal reimbursement under the "CAP". 
Recommendation #2 
That the current formula used to determine the state-federal match be altered . 
Application of the CAP concept currently used in the provision of Federal en-
titlement grants may have significant merit over the current use of the per capita 
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income formula element. The CAP concept is primarily related to the states 
~ capacity to financially support efforts in relationship to its need for service 
weighted against other states. Further, adjustments for differences in costs of 
medical care from one state to another could be included in the formula. Exam-
pIes of how these formula features may impact on individual states has been 
prepared by the Center for Governmental Research, working paper #3: The Medicaid 
Formula. The paper primarily addresses distributional and equalization effects 
of the Medicaid formula and Medicaid formula alternatives. These findings should 
be carefully considered on the Federal level as a means by which distributional 
objectives can be more equitably met. 
Recommendation #3 
That states create a separate office of Long-Term Care Administration. This 
state office should have the legislative power to license and certify facilities, 
~ enforce regulations, set rate structures, and determine long-term care needs. 
The office should develop a yearly prospective state plan which estimates total 
state expenditures for provision of long-term care. The state plan would be sub-
mitted to HEW where the long-term care categorical grant-in-aid formula would set 
the Federal match share of the requested state plan. The office should also have 
the power to rule on the appropriateness of any new facility or expansion of long-
term care facilities as it relates to the prospective state plan de~eloped. 
Recommendation #4 
That the state office of Long-Term Care Administration decentralize manage-
ment functions by the creation of Regional Management Offices. The regional 
offices would be held accountable for region-wide coordination of long-term care 
planning, rate setting, auditing, and coordination with the central state office 
of regulatory oversight. Each region would be responsible for preparing a 
~ prospective yearly regional expenditure plan and need estimate. The regional 
office would be expected to coordinate its efforts with regional and local planners 
• 
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to best determine where gaps in service occur. The regional management office 
need not be a purely state function. The state central office could contract 
with a regional not-for-profit management association comprised of providers, 
state and local officials, and citizens of the region. This independent asso-
ciation comprised of providers, state and local officials, and citizens of the 
regiono This independent association would hire appropriate staff to carry out 
the mandated functions of the state office. Such a scheme might be more pol-
itically feasible in areas where a high degree of leadership has produced 
superior long-term care services. This approach may work well in regions that 
are less densely populated. In rural regions Incorporated Provider Councils 
could exercise the regional management responsibility. The state central office 
would provide the regulatory enforcement and possibly the audit function. Only 
providers with superior facilities and proven administrative expertise should be 
• selected. Being recognized as the "experts" in their region should enhance the 
acceptance of a closer state monitoring role. In congested ,urban areas it is 
recommended that the state central office provide a direct management function. 
This continuum of options available to the state office of Long-Term Care 
Administration should produce an effective means by which the characteristics of 
individual regions within the state are recognized. It will also provide the 
state with significant flexibility in achieving its long-term care goals within 
the context of the regional perspective. 
Recommendation #S 
It is recommended that states adopt a prospective rate setting capability. 
Specifically, a scheme should be devised for dividing total per diem operating 
costs into cost categories, such as the Connecticut breakdown of controlled cost 
centers, uncontrolled costs, and asset valuation. Variation among homes in per 
• diem costs for each of the categories selected should be explained by use of 
multiple regression technqiues, such as the Moreland Commission applied in its 
• 
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study of 1970 nursing home costs. From this analysis, statistically typical costs 
can be determined. Adjustments could then be made relative to size, class, wage 
rates, and patient mix. This implies a "group average" outcome. The MOl~eland 
Commission report suggests: "Efficient care standards would be defined by 
determining the percentage that actual costs of standard setting homes are of 
the calculated statistically typical costs for these homes." Thus, a standard 
setting home in dietary service may have actual costs which are 95 percent of its 
regression estimated (that is a statistically typical) dietary cost. Efficient 
care standards for each home would be caluclated by applying this percentage 
() 
figure to each home's regression estimated cost. The goal of this approach is 
to set standards by which nursing homes will be reimbursed. It is further 
recommended that rates set using this scheme be set on a regional basis and be 
used as the basic determinant of the Regional Fiscal Plan submitted to the state 
• office for inclusion in the total state plan. In setting rates, states should 
apply the extent to which individual providers are meeting acceptable care 
standards. States should not reward providers for achieving superior ratings in 
care standard review audits. This will only proulgate the increased development 
of "lavish facilities." The goal should be to equalize the quality of care 
provided in all state facilities. 
Incentives should be given to proprietors who have demonstrated cost effective-
ness and achieved acceptable ratings relative to care provision. It is recom-
mended that states permit facilities to retain as profit a percent of unspent 
moneys for each cost category. 
Recommendation #6 
It is recommended that states adopt a property reimbursement cost system 
similar to the New York State "Fair Rental System,ff As was stated earlier, 
• this system does not permit reimbursement to vary depending on whether a facility 
is leased or operated directly by an owner and does not change because of sales 
• 
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from one entrepreneur to another. All homes are depreciated based on an average 
life of 40 years. This bold approach to eliminating nursing home abuses should 
be viewed with interest by every state. One criticism of the "Fair Rental System" 
is that it may hamper proprietors with sound track records in receiving a fair 
return on their investment. It is recommended that this feature be changed either 
through the use of a review process or point system which would award proprietors 
who have deomonstr.ated "good fai th" in the provision of service some measure of 
flexibility in receiving current asset valuations for the sale of properties. 
CONCLUSION 
The intent of this exercise has been to describe the current structure of 
finance applied to the long-term care industry. An effort was made to analyze 
various problems occurring within the structures and recommend corrective 
• procedures. The recommendations provided do not alter the essential responsi-
bilities currently existing withj?n the Federal and state governmental structures. 
Rather, they suggest steps which will strengthen the system which currently 
• 
exists. 
The rapid growth and development of the long-term care industry coupled with 
the "skyrocketing" costs of the Medicaid program mandate a thorough re-examination 
on the Federal and state level of each governmental unit's commitment to long-
term care. This can be best accomplished through a "partnership" effort between 
the Federal gover~~ent and various states . 
• 
• 
• 
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